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Abstract
Optimistic contract signing protocols allow two parties to commit to a previously agreed upon
contract, relying on a third party to abort or con.rm the contract if needed. These protocols are
relatively subtle, since there may be interactions between the subprotocols used for normal signing
without the third party, aborting the protocol through the third party, or requesting con.rmation
from the third party. With the help of Mur’, a .nite-state veri.cation tool, we analyze two
related contract signing protocols: the optimistic contract signing protocol of Asokan, Shoup,
and Waidner, and the abuse-free contract signing protocol of Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie.
For the .rst protocol, we discover that a malicious participant can produce inconsistent versions
of the contract or mount a replay attack. For the second protocol, we discover that negligence
or corruption of the trusted third party may allow abuse or unfairness. In this case, contrary
to the intent of the protocol, the cheated party is not able to hold the third party accountable.
We present and analyze modi.cations to the protocols that avoid these problems and discuss
the basic challenges involved in formal analysis of fair exchange protocols. c© 2002 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Protocol analysis; Formal methods; Finite-state analysis; Model checking; Fair
exchange; Contract signing
1. Introduction
Contracts are an important part of business. If two parties wish to sign a contract,
but do not share other motives, then each may refuse to sign until the other has demon-
strated its commitment to the contract. While simultaneous commitment to contracts
printed on paper can be achieved by sitting at a table and signing identical paper
copies, distributed contract signing over a network is inherently asymmetric: someone
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has to send the .rst message. In one contemporary style of contract signing protocols,
two rounds of communication are used. In the .rst round, each party declares their
willingness to be bound by the contract. In the second, they each send some remaining
data needed to satisfy the de.nition of signed contract established by the protocol.
If a trusted third party is able to enforce the contract based on partial completion of
the protocol, then it is possible to conduct distributed contract signing so that various
symmetric correctness conditions are satis.ed. In optimistic contract signing, the third
party is only needed in case of a dispute. Otherwise, the protocol can be completed
without involving the third party.
The most basic correctness condition for contract signing is called fairness. A con-
tract signing protocol is fair if, after completion of the protocol, either both parties
have a signed contract, or neither does. Another property is called accountability: if
any party cheats by not following the steps required by the protocol, the resulting
network messages will unambiguously show which party has cheated. Accountability
is particularly desirable for the trusted third party, since the third party has the ability
to resolve or abort a contract.
A more complex correctness condition, introduced in [17], has been called abuse-
freeness. This condition is intended to guarantee that neither party has a speci.c kind of
advantage over the other during the execution of the protocol. To illustrate by example,
suppose Alice agrees to sell her house to Bob and Bob signs a contract containing a
certain price. If Alice holds the contract without signing, she can show the contract to
a competing buyer Carol and convince Carol that she needs to pay more than Bob if
she wants the house. This is disadvantageous for Bob, since information he provides
to Alice as part of signing an agreed contract is used to Alice’s advantage. In this
scenario, abuse is possible only if Bob’s signature on the contract is in a form that
Carol can read and understand; this is necessary since Alice must convince Carol that
she has the choice to accept Bob’s oJer or turn Bob down and sign a new contract
with Carol. This kind of abuse can be prevented in physical simultaneous transactions,
but it is diKcult to prevent in distributed protocols since a sequential protocol has the
potential to bind one party before the other.
In this paper, we describe the results of automated analysis of two optimistic contract
signing protocols. The .rst protocol was proposed by Asokan et al. [2]; we shall refer
to it as the ASW protocol. The ASW protocol uses standard cryptography and special
forms of contract to guarantee fairness and accountability of the trusted third party.
The second protocol was proposed by Garay et al. [17]; we shall refer to it as the
GJM protocol. It relies on a cryptographic construct called private contract signature
to guarantee abuse-freeness in addition to fairness and third party accountability.
Using a .nite-state enumeration tool called Mur’, we verify correctness properties
claimed for the protocols and uncover several weaknesses. The process of using Mur’
involves formulating the protocol and potential attacks in a simpli.ed programming
language and allowing Mur’ to exhaustively try all possible attacks on all possi-
ble protocol runs (within certain bounds on the number of protocol instances con-
sidered in a run). Since the number of states explored is enormous, the only output
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of Mur’ that bears repeating in a technical paper are the speci.c runs that lead to
failure of one or more correctness conditions. For those interested in the form of
the input language, the general method for analyzing security protocols, or the meth-
ods employed in the implementation of Mur’, additional details may be found in
[13, 29, 27]. Since the most complicated issue in carrying out a Mur’ analysis of a
contract signing protocol are the high-level decisions on how to formalize the protocol,
how to account for dishonest participants or an external attacker, and how to formulate
the correctness conditions, the paper focuses on these issues and the results of the
analysis.
Our .nite-state analysis of the ASW protocol shows that a malicious protocol partic-
ipant is able to obtain a valid contract while the honest participant, even by requesting
help from the trusted third party, can only obtain a replacement contract which is
inconsistent with the one possessed by the malicious participant. The same protocol
weakness also allows the intruder to stage a replay attack.
Our .nite-state analysis of the GJM protocol reveals an attack that leads to the loss
of abuse-freeness and third party accountability. Speci.cally, the contract initiator, O,
using a weak form of passive assistance (or information leak) from the third party, is
able to choose whether to reveal a completed contract or accept an abort token provided
by the third party. Furthermore, if O chooses to reveal its completed contract, and the
discrepancy with R’s abort token is observed, it is not possible to determine whether
the third party participated in the inconsistency or not.
Although the sequences of actions demonstrating these weaknesses are relatively
short and easy to follow, the analysis is subtle in several respects. First, both se-
quences involve interaction between the optimistic two-party transaction normally used
to sign a contract, the abort protocol used by one party to time out and stop the pro-
tocol, and the resolve protocol used to request enforcement by the third party. As a
result of the number of possible interactions between these three subprotocols, we did
not suspect any problems until our analysis tool uncovered violations of one of our
correctness conditions. Only then, after examining the traces provided, were we able
to isolate speci.c aspects of the protocols that allow the attacks. More generally, the
power of .nite-state analysis lies in the ability to consider all possible interleavings of
actions, including possible runs that are counterintuitive or not expected by designers
of the protocol. Although we do not wish to fault the authors for an honest mistake,
this point is supported by review of the GJM correctness proof. The proof printed in
[17] proceeds by considering a number of cases but overlooks the speci.c sequence of
actions uncovered by our exhaustive brute-force analysis. While humans generally pre-
fer to reason using general concepts that seem to cover all of the relevant phenomena,
.nite-state analysis examines all runs methodically and exhaustively, often uncovering
problems that could otherwise go undetected.
For both protocols, we suggest simple changes that prevent the attacks. For the GJM
protocol, the same repair was also proposed by the authors of the protocol after we
described the attack [22]. The repaired protocols appear to be correct, at least within the
accuracy of our model; Mur’ analysis does not suggest any errors. We also show that
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some assumptions about the communication channels can be relaxed without violating
fairness or other intended properties of the protocols.
There is some subtlety in the way that the basic protocol requirements, fairness,
abuse-freeness, and accountability, are speci.ed. For example, an abort message from
the trusted third party does not mean that no participant will receive a contract. Abort
simply means that the third party will not subsequently con.rm the contract. This is
inherent in optimistic two-party protocols: after the protocol has .nished without in-
volving the third party, one of the parties can ask the third party to abort the protocol
and the third party, having received no previous messages, is engineered to oblige.
Another subtlety surrounds abuse-freeness, which is an assertion about choices at in-
termediate states in the execution of the protocol. Abuse-freeness is not a property that
can be determined by examining individual traces of protocol execution independently.
Since Mur’ is a trace-based tool, we had to devise some extension of the protocol
environment, involving an outside party who issues sign and abort challenges, in order
to automatically verify the states in which one participant has the power to determine
the eventual outcome of the protocol.
Formal methods have been used to analyze the security properties of key exchange
and authentication protocols [20, 31, 25, 6, 30]. In particular, .nite-state analysis has
been successfully applied to protocols such as Needham-Schroeder [21, 24, 23], Ker-
beros [27], SSL [28], and others. However, less attention has been paid to other kinds of
protocols, such as fair exchange. In [18], Heintze et al. used the FDR model checker to
verify NetBill [10] and a digital cash protocol inspired by Digicash [8, 9]. The correct-
ness conditions they establish are diJerent in character from the ones we consider here.
Schneider [34] analyzed the CSP [32, 33] model of the Zhou–Gollmann non-repudiation
protocol [38], using process failures to express fairness as a liveness property. In our
approach, we model fairness by a set of state invariants as described in Section 5.1,
and verify a wider set of protocol properties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background
on fair exchange protocols and the formal tool we used for our analysis, Section 3
describes the ASW protocol, and Section 4 speci.es the correctness conditions for
optimistic contract signing protocols. Section 5 deals with the issues involved in formal
modeling of fair exchange. Results of the analysis and suggested repairs to the ASW
protocol are presented in Section 6. Section 7 describes the GJM protocol, which is
then analyzed in Section 8. Brief concluding remarks appear in Section 9.
Preliminary accounts of the protocol analyses presented in this paper were previously
published in conference proceedings [35, 36].
2. Background
2.1. Overview of Mur’
Mur’ [13] is a .nite-state machine veri.cation tool. Originally developed for hard-
ware veri.cation, Mur’ has been successfully used for analyzing security protocols
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[27, 28, 37]. The Mur’ input language is a simple high-level language for describ-
ing nondeterministic .nite-state machines. The input model consists of the descrip-
tion of variables that de.ne the state of the system and a set of guarded rules that
represent actions. While there is no explicit notion of process, a process can be
implicitly modeled by a set of related rules. Communication between processes is
modeled by shared variables. The Mur’ system automatically checks, by explicit
state enumeration, if every reachable state of the model satis.es a given set of
invariants.
To analyze a security protocol in Mur’, it is necessary to combine the .nite-state
model of the protocol expressed in the Mur’ language with the intruder model, specify
the start state of the protocol, and formally state protocol invariants as boolean condi-
tions that must be true in every state reachable from the start state. The intruder model
typically consists of a set of variables that contain the intruder’s knowledge and a set
of actions that the intruder may take. We use a very simple, mechanical intruder model.
The intruder is assumed to have full control over the public network and allowed to
take the following actions: (1) overhear every message, decrypt encrypted messages if
it has the key, store parts of message in its internal database, (2) intercept messages
and remove them from the network, (3) generate messages using any combination of
its initial knowledge, parts of overheard messages, known keys, and other data avail-
able to it. If at any moment there are several possible actions that the intruder can
take, one is chosen nondeterministically. The Mur’ system will analyze all states that
are reachable via any interleaving of enabled actions.
Limitations of this approach include the fact that our intruder model has no notion
of partial information or probability. It cannot perform cryptanalysis or statistical tests
of the network traKc, and it follows the “black box” cryptography model: an encrypted
message can be read only if the decrypting key is known, otherwise its contents are
assumed to be invisible to the intruder (who is still capable of storing the message and
replaying it later in a diJerent context).
If Mur’ .nds a reachable state in which an invariant is violated, it outputs the
sequence of rules leading to it from the start state. This sequence eJectively describes
the attack. If Mur’ fails to .nd an invariant violation, this is not a proof that the
protocol is correct. Since Mur’ can only consider .nite models, the number of protocol
instances under analysis must be bounded. Therefore, if an attack on the protocol
requires a certain number of protocol instances and the size of the analyzed model is
less than the threshold, the attack will not be discovered. Also, certain kinds of attacks,
in particular attacks involving cryptanalysis, are beyond the scope of the model. In the
rest of the paper, we refer to this intruder model as the Dolev–Yao intruder, following
[14]. Some general discussion and complexity results regarding the model can be found
in [7, 15].
A new-generation Mur’, currently under development at Stanford, uses the predicate
abstraction method to model check in.nite state spaces. It was used by Satyaki Das
to analyze multiple instances of the GJM protocol. This is discussed in Section 8.4
below.
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2.2. Fair exchange
Intuitively, a protocol is fair if no protocol participant can gain an advantage over
other participants by misbehaving. For example, a protocol in which two parties ex-
change one item for another is fair if it ensures that at the end of the exchange, either
each party receives the item it expects, or neither receives any information about the
other’s item [2]. There exists a large body of literature on fair exchange protocols.
Applications include online payment systems, in which a payment is exchanged for an
item of value, e.g. [10], contract signing, in which parties exchange commitments to
a contractual text, such as [5, 2, 17], certi.ed electronic mail, for example [3, 38, 12],
and other purposes. There are several varieties of fair exchange protocols.
Gradual exchange protocols [5, 11] work by having the parties release their secrets
in small installments, thus ensuring that at any given moment no party has a signi.cant
advantage. The drawback of this approach is that a large number of communication
steps between the parties is required. Gradual exchange is also problematic if the items
to be exchanged have “threshold” value (either the item is valuable, or it is not).
Another category of fair exchange protocols is based on the notion of a trusted
third party, for example [10, 38, 12]. The trusted third party supervises communication
between the protocol participants and ensures that no participant receives the item it
wants before releasing its own item. Variations of this approach include fair exchange
protocols with a semi-trusted third party [16]. The main drawback of the third party
solution is that the third party may become the communication bottleneck if it has to
be involved in all instances of the protocol in order to guarantee fairness. The protocol
may also need to impose demands on the communication channels, e.g., by requiring
that all messages are eventually delivered to their intended recipients.
Recently, several protocols have been proposed for optimistic fair exchange [2, 4, 17].
While the third party T may need to be trusted by all parties to the exchange, T needs
to act only if one of the parties misbehaves or there is a communication failure. This
may ease the communication bottleneck associated with T , making fair exchange more
practical for realistic applications.
The contract signing protocol of Garay et al. [17] extends the concept of fairness
by introducing the notion of abuse-freeness. Informally, a protocol is abuse-free if
neither participant can prove to an outside party that it has the power to abort the
protocol or successfully complete contract negotiation. In .nancial applications, the
ability to prove that one can resolve or abort a particular contract negotiation may be
as important as the actual signing of a contract, making abuse-freeness critical for fair
exchange protocols to be deployed in the .nancial arena.
3. Asokan--Shoup--Waidner protocol
In this section, we describe the optimistic contract signing protocol by Asokan et al.
[2] (the ASW protocol). We start by giving a high-level description of the objectives
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of the protocol and the assumptions under which it operates, and then explain the
protocol steps in detail. The notation has been changed from the original paper to
facilitate explanation.
It is worth noting that, intuitively, one might expect a contract to be a pair of
digital signatures of an agreed upon text, one signature from each party negotiating the
contract. This is not the case in the ASW protocol. Normal termination without use of
the third party will produce a contract that contains two digital signatures and additional
data generated in the run of the protocol. However, the contracts produced by the third
party are not necessarily of this form. In order to understand the ASW protocol, it is
important to keep in mind not only the steps of each subprotocol (discussed below), but
also the forms of contract that the protocol designers have established for the protocol.
3.1. Objectives
The ASW protocol is designed to enable two parties, called O (originator) and R
(responder), to obtain each other’s commitment on a previously agreed contractual
text. The protocol is asynchronous. As the exchange subprotocol progresses, either
participant may contact the trusted third party T . The third party may decide, on the
basis of communication it has received, whether to issue a replacement contract or
an abort token. Abort tokens are not a proof that the exchange has been canceled, as
explained below.
3.2. Assumptions
The protocol uses conventional, universally veri.able digital signatures and a hash
function. We write S-Sigi(: : :) for a message signed by party i and assume that all
protocol participants have the ability to verify signatures produced by any party. We
also assume that there exists a collision-resistant one-way hash function, hash().
Prior to executing the protocol, the parties are assumed to agree on each other’s
identity, the identity of the trusted third party T , and the contractual text. It is also
assumed that every protocol participant knows everybody else’s signature veri.cation
key, which is typically the public key. This implies that the protocol must be preceded
by the “handshake” phase in which a key exchange and=or authentication protocol is
executed to establish the shared initial knowledge. Since it is not necessary for the
handshake protocol to guarantee fairness, we do not consider it as part of this study.
The original paper [2] states that the communication channels between any two
protocol participants are assumed to be con6dential, i.e., eavesdroppers will not be
able to determine the contents of messages traveling through these channels. This can
be achieved by encrypting all messages with the intended recipient’s public key. It is
also assumed that the channels between each participant and the trusted third party T
are resilient, i.e., any message deposited into the channel will eventually be delivered to
its intended recipient. However, there are no time guarantees: the intruder can succeed
in delaying messages by an arbitrary, but .nite amount of time. In Section 6 below,
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we analyze the protocol under various assumptions about the quality of communication
channels.
Implicit in the protocol speci.cation is the assumption that the trusted third party T
must maintain a permanent database with the status of every protocol run that it has
ever been asked to abort or resolve. (Each run can be identi.ed by the .rst message
me1—see below.) Abort and resolve requests are processed by T on the .rst-come,
.rst-served basis. Therefore, in order to ensure fairness, T must always be able to
determine whether a particular instance of the protocol has been aborted or resolved
already.
3.3. Protocol
The ASW protocol consists of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort,
and resolve. The parties (O and R) generally start the exchange by following the
exchange subprotocol. If both O and R are honest and there is no interference from the
network, each obtains a valid contract upon the completion of the exchange subprotocol.
The originator O also has the option of requesting the trusted third party T to abort
an exchange that O has initiated. To do so, O executes the abort subprotocol with T .
Finally, both O and R may each request that T resolve an exchange that has not been
completed. After receiving the initial message of the exchange protocol, they may do
so by executing the resolve subprotocol with T .
At the end of the protocol, each party is guaranteed to end up with a valid contract
or an abort token. As described brieQy above, the protocol de.nition in [2] provides
two forms of contract:
{me1; NO; me2; NR} (standard contract)
S-SigT{me1; me2} (replacement contract)
where me1; me2; NO; NR are de.ned below. Note that the protocol de.nition does not
consider a signed contractual text by itself a valid contract.
Abort tokens have the following form:
S-SigT{aborted; ma1}
where ma1 is de.ned below.
An abort token should not be interpreted as a proof that the exchange has been
canceled. The protocol does not prevent a dishonest O from obtaining an abort token
after signing the contract with R. (In this case, O may have both the abort token and
the contract, while R only has the contract.) The protocol is designed, however, to
prevent one party from receiving only the abort token in any situation where the other
can receive a valid contract.
3.3.1. Exchange subprotocol
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that prior to initiating the exchange, the two
parties agree on the contractual text (text) and the identity of the trusted third party T .
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They are also assumed to know each other’s public veri.cation key. Speci.cally, O
knows the key VR that can be used to verify messages signed by R, and R knows VO.
When there is no delay or blockage of network messages and neither party tries to
cheat the other, O and R may create a contract by the following steps:
O → R me1 = S-SigO{VO; VR; T; text; hash(NO)}
R → O me2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(NR)}
O → R me3 = NO
R → O me4 = NR
In the .rst step of the subprotocol, O commits to the contractual text by hashing a
random number NO, and signing a message that contains both hash(NO) and text. NO
is called the contract authenticator. While O does not actually reveal the value of
the contract authenticator to the recipient of message me1, O is committed to it. As
in a standard commitment protocol, we assume that the hash function is 2nd-preimage
resistant: it is not computationally feasible for O to .nd a diJerent number N ′O such
that hash(N ′O)= hash(NO).
In the second step, R replies with its own commitment. Finally, O and R exchange
the actual contract authenticators. At the end of the exchange, both O and R obtain a
standard contract of the form {me1; NO; me2; NR}.
3.3.2. Abort subprotocol
The initiator O may attempt to abort the exchange. An honest O may do this if a
reply from R is not received within a reasonable amount of time. To abort, O sends
an abort request to the trusted third party T by signing the .rst message me1 of the
exchange together with aborted. We assume that aborted is some prede.ned bit string.
Here are the steps of the abort subprotocol, with further description of T ’s action
below:
O → T ma1 = S-SigO{aborted; me1}
T → O ma2 = Has me1 been resolved already?
Yes : S-SigT{me1; me2}
No : S-SigT{aborted; ma1}
aborted := true
When T receives an abort request, T checks its permanent database of past actions to
decide how to proceed. If T has not previously been requested to resolve this instance
of the protocol, T marks me1 as aborted in its permanent database and sends an abort
token to O. If me1 is already marked as resolved, this means that T has previously
resolved this exchange in response to an earlier request (as described below). T must
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have obtained both me1 and me2. Therefore, in response to O’s abort request, T creates
a replacement contract S-SigT{me1; me2} and sends it to O.
Since T stores the result of aborting (indicated by aborted := true) in its permanent
database, an abort token is eJectively a promise by T that it will not resolve this
instance of the protocol in the future. As mentioned above, an abort token is not a
proof that the exchange has been aborted, as the parties can complete contract signing
without involving T if they follow the exchange subprotocol.
It is useful to bear in mind that while an honest O may send an abort request to T
if it does not receive me2 within a reasonable time, there is no guarantee that O will
be able to abort. If the exchange has been already resolved by someone who knows
both me1 and me2, T will not grant the abort request and will send O a replacement
contract instead – even if O has not received me2. Note also that even though R is not
allowed to send abort requests to T , this does not put R at a disadvantage since it has
the option of simply ignoring all messages from O.
3.3.3. Resolve subprotocol
Either party may request that T resolve the exchange. In order to do so, the party
must possess both me1 and me2. Therefore, R can send a resolve request at any time
after receiving me1, and O can do so at any time after receiving me2. When T receives
a resolve request, it checks whether me1 is already marked as aborted. If it is, T replies
with the abort token, otherwise it marks me1 as resolved and generates a replacement
contract by counter-signing the resolve request.
Below, we show the resolve protocol between R and T . The protocol between O
and T is symmetric.
R → T mr1 = {me1; me2}
T → R mr2 = Has me1 been aborted already?
Yes : S-SigT{aborted; ma1}
No : S-SigT{me1; me2}
resolved := true
Although the generated contract has a diJerent form than the contract produced by the
exchange subprotocol, the protocol design assumes that in any transaction requiring
a contract, either form would be accepted as binding. In other words, the protocol
designers consider the de.nition of contract to be part of the protocol speci.cation and
choose to use two forms of valid contract in their protocol. Note, however, that the
speci.cation does not indicate how two contracts that have the same form but contain
contradictory information (e.g., diJerent nonces) should be treated.
The .rst request received by T determines the permanent status of the protocol. After
T resolves or aborts the protocol for the .rst time, it should send identical replies in
response to all future requests. If the .rst request to reach T is an abort request from
O, T ’s response to all requests will be the abort token. If the .rst request to reach T
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is a resolve request from O or R, T ’s response to all requests will be the replacement
contract. This leads to an implicit race condition which is not, however, a violation of
fairness requirements as de.ned in Section 4.
4. Correctness conditions
In this section, we specify the correctness conditions that must be satis.ed by an
optimistic contract signing protocol. To simplify the presentation, we combine the guar-
antees for ASW [2] and GJM [17] protocols into one set of properties. Even though the
two papers employ slightly diJerent terminology, the fairness properties they consider
are essentially identical, with the exception of abuse-freeness. Both protocols claim
that the properties will be satis.ed assuming that the communication channels are re-
silient, i.e., messages can be arbitrarily delayed and=or scheduled, but will be eventually
delivered to their intended recipients.
Fairness. Fairness for protocol participants involves several conditions:
• It is impossible for a corrupt participant to obtain a valid contract without allowing
the remaining participant to also obtain a valid contract. Another way of stating
this [2] is that when the protocol has completed, either both O and R have valid
contracts, or neither one does.
• Once an honest participant obtains a cancellation message (i.e., an abort token) from
the trusted third party T , it is impossible for any other participant to obtain a valid
contract.
• Every honest participant is guaranteed to complete the protocol.
Trusted third party accountability. If the trusted third party T can be forced to
eventually send a valid reply to every request, then any participant who is cheated as
a result of T ’s misbehavior will be able to prove that T misbehaved in an external
dispute. It is not speci.ed precisely what can serve as a proof of misbehavior, but
typically such proof consists of two contradictory messages signed by T [1], e.g., an
abort token and a replacement contract.
Abuse-freeness. The ASW protocol [2] is not designed to guarantee this property,
but we mention it here for the sake of uniformity. A protocol is abuse-free if it is
impossible for a protocol participant, at any point in the protocol, to be able to prove
to an outside party that he has the power to choose between aborting and successfully
completing the contract. One of the main contributions of [17] is to introduce the
notion of abuse-freeness to electronic contract signing.
There are other properties supported by the protocols, such as timeliness and non-
repudiability, but we did not model them formally and omit them for the purposes of
this analysis.
5. Formal modeling
Section 2.1 described our general approach to protocol analysis, which involves mod-
eling protocol participants and the adversary as non-deterministic .nite-state machines.
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This allows violations of correctness conditions to be detected by fully automated, ex-
haustive search of the resulting state space. In this section, we focus on the modeling
issues arising in the application of .nite-state analysis to fair exchange protocols.
Fair exchange protocols present several challenges. To begin with, fairness invariants
may be diKcult to express precisely, given only an informal protocol speci.cation.
Second, since fair exchange protocols are designed to protect honest participants from
being cheated by a misbehaving counterpart, it is necessary to model malicious or
corrupt protocol participants in addition to the standard network-based intruder. Third,
fair exchange protocols with the trusted third party typically provide a guarantee of
third party veri.ability or accountability, promising that any loss of fairness resulting
from the third party’s corruption can be traced and proven to an outside arbiter. These
guarantees are diKcult to understand and formalize for automated veri.cation. There
are also challenges associated with abuse-freeness.
5.1. Modeling fairness
Mur’, the .nite-state veri.cation tool we used to perform the analyses described
in this paper, can only search for violations of state invariants. In general, liveness
properties such as fairness cannot be expressed in the Mur’ language. This leads some
researchers to prefer more expressive tools. For instance, in [34] fairness properties
of the Zhou–Gollmann non-repudiation protocol [38] are expressed as predicates on
process failures. However, the fairness conditions de.ned in Section 4 can be expressed
as safety properties.
To formulate fairness as a safety property, we only verify fairness in the states
in which an honest participant cannot perform any action according to the protocol
speci.cation. We will call such states participant-terminal. Here is a (slightly simpli-
.ed) sample of Mur’ code illustrating how fairness for the originator O in the ASW
protocol (see Section 3.3) is formally expressed as a Mur’ state invariant:
— If R has O’s nonce or a valid replacement contract,
— then O must have R’s nonce or a valid replacement contract
rule "O has been cheated"
— Fairness is not guaranteed if T is corrupt
!badT[O.trustedParty]) &
— O finished protocol
O.state = M DONE &
(
— R has O’s nonce
R.otherNonce = O.ownNonce |
— ... or a valid replacement contract
R.replacement.me1 commit.n1 = O.ownNonce
) &
(
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— O has the wrong nonce
O.otherNonce = O.otherCommit.n1 &
O.otherNonce != R.ownNonce) |
— O does not have a replacement contract
isundefined(O.replacement)) |
— O’s replacement contract is wrong
O.replacement.me2 commit.n1 != R.ownNonce))
)
==>
begin
error "R has O’s nonce or a valid replacement contract,
but O doesn’t have R’s"
end;
end;
end;
The rule signals an error if R possesses O’s valid contract, but O does not have R’s
contract. Note that the rule is conditional on O’s being in state M DONE, i.e., it only
.res if O has completed its execution sequence in the protocol.
5.2. Soundness
Monotonicity. The soundness of our formulation of fairness, explained in Section 5.1
above, follows from the fact that fairness for these protocols is monotonic. In other
words, if a run of a protocol ceases to be fair at some point, then it remains unfair
for the remainder of the run. More speci.cally, if the protocol reaches a state SE in
which one party has a contract, and the other has no means of obtaining one, then this
condition will hold true in all subsequent states no matter what actions the cheated party
undertakes. If this were not true and there existed a sequence of actions that brings the
protocol to a state in which the cheated party obtains a contract, then fairness would
not have been violated in state SE , and we arrive at a contradiction.
Therefore, we need not be concerned with discovering fairness violations in the
intermediate states where they must be expressed as liveness properties (e.g., “O has
no means of obtaining a valid contract”, or “no contract will be available to O in
the future”). Every such violation is preserved in all subsequent states, some of which
are participant-terminal. Therefore, we can simply let the protocol run its course, and
search for fairness violations only in the participant-terminal states, where they can be
expressed as safety properties (e.g., “R has a contract, but O doesn’t”).
To complete the argument that our formulation is correct, we need to show that
every protocol instance will reach a participant-terminal state even if fairness has been
violated in an intermediate state. The argument relies on the following three properties:
Finiteness. All execution sequences of the protocol are .nite.
Progress of honest participants. For each honest protocol participant P and each
state Si, we can de.ne Si|P to be the partial state consisting only of P’s private state
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variables. Si|P can be thought of as P’s view of what is happening in the protocol.
Obviously, it is possible that Si|P= Sj|P for some i and j, i.e., diJerent states may
project to the same partial state as far as P is concerned.
For each honest participant P, the protocol speci.cation provides a complete ordering
of Si|P. Each time P sends or receives a message, it progresses to the next state,
eventually reaching the end of its execution sequence. Once P leaves a state, it cannot
reach it again. For example, in the ASW protocol (Section 3.3), O starts in the partial
state where it is ready to send message me1, then progresses to the state where it
has dispatched me1 and is waiting for me2, then to the state where it has received
me2, sent me3, and is waiting for me4, and .nally reaches the participant-terminal state
(represented by O.state= M DONE in the code sample above) where it has received
me4 and considers the protocol completed.
Channel resilience. In the protocols discussed in this paper, all communication chan-
nels are assumed to be resilient, i.e., it is guaranteed that every message will be eventu-
ally delivered. Therefore, we can assume that every honest participant will progress to
the end of its execution sequence even if a successful attack on fairness was staged in
an intermediate state. In the example above, this means the protocol will reach a state
S∗ such that S∗|O is considered by O to be a terminal state, i.e., O.state= M DONE.
Channel resilience is a fairly realistic assumption for real-world networks. In fact, if
channels are non-resilient, then the intruder can defeat any protocol by simply inter-
cepting messages and preventing them from reaching their intended recipients.
The modeling technique presented in this section extends the applicability of fully
automated .nite-state analysis to a large class of fairness properties while keeping the
formalism conceptually simple and restricted to safety properties. There is an eKciency
cost. If we could discover fairness violations immediately in the states where they .rst
occur instead of delaying the discovery until the cheated participant reaches the end of
its execution sequence, we would not need to generate all the state subspaces rooted in
the violating states. The exact number of states that are generated unnecessarily cannot
be estimated in general as it depends on the particular protocol and the nature of the
attack that leads to the loss of fairness. EJectively, the tradeoJ is between running a
simple, robust, well-understood .nite-state analysis tool such as Mur’ for a bit longer,
and modeling the entire protocol in a richer formalism that allows direct expression of
liveness properties.
5.3. Modeling trusted third party accountability
Accountability only holds if the trusted third party is guaranteed to send a valid
response to all requests. Also, O must be noti.ed whenever R tries to enforce a contract,
and vice versa. If a protocol participant does not know that it is being cheated, it cannot
go after T to prove its misbehavior.
Before formulating a formal protocol invariant that could be veri.ed with the help of
Mur’, it is necessary to determine what it means to be able to prove T ’s misbehavior.
Based on our interpretation of the protocol description in [2], we believe that the
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cheated protocol participant can prove that T misbehaved if and only if it can produce
two documents, both signed by T , that contradict each other. More speci.cally, the
cheated participant must be able to demonstrate an abort token signed by T and a
replacement contract for the same instance of the protocol, also signed by T . Since
T is supposed to process all abort and resolve requests on the .rst-come, .rst-served
basis and the initial request determines the status of the protocol in perpetuity, it should
never be the case that T issues both an abort token and a replacement contract for the
same instance of the protocol.
Based on the above interpretation, we believe that third party accountability is vi-
olated if and only if the following conditions hold (the conditions are formulated
assuming that O is the cheated party; the conditions for R are symmetric):
• T is corrupt (see Section 5.5).
• R has O’s contract authenticator.
• O has neither R’s contract authenticator, nor a replacement contract signed by T .
If R has a replacement contract signed by T instead of a standard contract with O’s
contract authenticator, then T is always accountable! Suppose that R tries to enforce
its replacement contract. When O goes to T and requests to either abort, or resolve
the protocol, T must send O a valid response. If T sends a replacement contract, then
there is no fairness violation and O is not cheated since both parties possess the same
contract. If T sends an abort token, then O is indeed cheated (since R has a contract
and O does not), but O can then prove T ’s misbehavior by demonstrating its abort
token and R’s replacement contract, both signed by T .
However, if R has a standard contract with O’s contract authenticator, then R’s
contract is not signed by T , and O cannot prove T ’s misbehavior since it cannot
produce two inconsistent documents signed by T . This case satis.es the conditions
listed above.
These conditions can be modeled by simple state invariants. Therefore, trusted third
party accountability can be veri.ed with the help of Mur’.
5.4. Modeling abuse-freeness
Unlike basic fairness, abuse-freeness is not a monotonic property, and cannot be
easily converted into a safety guarantee. Both fairness and abuse-freeness are assertions
about future executions. Fairness violations, however, are existential properties of traces
and can thus be found by analyzing each trace separately (e.g., “there exists a trace
such that O has R’s valid contract, but R cannot obtain O’s valid contract by following
the protocol speci.cation”). Therefore, we can convert fairness conditions into safety
properties to be evaluated in terminal states as described in Section 5.1, and delay the
discovery of violations until the trace has completed.
Violations of abuse-freeness, on the other hand, are universal properties of traces
(“for all possible traces, one of the parties can (a) determine the outcome of the pro-
tocol, and (b) prove this ability to an outside party”). They only occur in intermediate
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states, before a particular execution sequence has been chosen by the participants, and
cannot be discovered by analyzing the terminal state of an individual trace.
Our partial approach to verifying whether abuse-freeness is violated in the protocol
consists of two stages. First, we use Mur’ to determine whether any protocol partic-
ipant possesses the power to determine the outcome of the protocol regardless of the
actions of the other party, assuming the other party is honest and genuinely interested
in signing the contract. This is done by augmenting the system with an additional
outside party we call the Challenger.
In order to verify whether a participant P has the power at some point in the
protocol, we have it send a message to the Challenger asserting its control over the
outcome. The Challenger then nondeterministically chooses a desired outcome: abort
or successful contract completion. (It is a consequence of fairness that there are only
two possible outcomes: either T aborts and no one receives a signed contract or both
parties receive a signed contract.)
After receiving the Challenger’s request, P has to interact with the honest participant
in such a way so as to drive the protocol to the requested outcome. If there exists a
trace in which the outcome of the protocol is not consistent with that requested by the
Challenger, we conclude that P does not possess the power to determine the outcome.
The key idea here is that determining whether P satis.es the Challenger’s request is a
state invariant and can be veri.ed by Mur’.
The second part of violation is that a participant P with the power to determine
the outcome must be able to prove this to an outside arbiter. However, we have
not formulated a straightforward way of verifying properties such as “P can prove
something” in Mur’. Therefore, we have only analyzed this part of the protocol by
informal means.
Our analysis of abuse-freeness of the original and repaired GJM protocols can be
found in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively.
5.5. Modeling corrupt participants
Fair exchange protocols must protect an honest participant from being cheated by
a malicious counterpart. Therefore, analysis of a fair exchange protocol must consider
the possibility of one or more participants becoming corrupt and cooperating with
the intruder. In our formal model, we keep the intruder and the malicious protocol
participant separate. This enables us to consider several conceptual levels of corruption.
Distinguishing between them is useful for analyzing real-world implications of the
protocols.
In the simplest case, the corrupt participant is assumed to share its private key with
the intruder, enabling the latter to sign and decrypt messages on its behalf. This is
equivalent to the intruder using the corrupt party as an oracle for signing and decrypting
messages. We will call such collaboration with the intruder strong corruption. We do
not consider the case when a party divulges its private key to everybody since it can
be represented by sending all messages encrypted with that key in plaintext.
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A weaker form of corruption occurs when a protocol participant does not share its
key with the intruder, and does not sign any messages it is not supposed to sign in
the normal course of the protocol. However, it may be willing to engage the intruder’s
help in obtaining an unfair advantage in the exchange or contract signing process. This
may involve accepting messages from the intruder and lying to an outside party about
their source, e.g., by claiming that they arrived from the protocol counterpart or T
through the standard communication channels. We will call this weak corruption.
A weakly corrupt protocol participant is akin to a fence who is willing to accept
hot goods without asking too many questions but will not do anything overtly illegal
himself. A contract signing protocol that does not protect an honest participant from
being cheated by a weakly corrupt counterpart defeats its own purpose and is largely
useless. In the real world, it is impossible to be sure that an untrusted agent is not
weakly corrupt, i.e., that it is not acting in collusion with the intruder who has control
over the public network on which the contract is negotiated.
The weakest form of corruption is the case when a participant, perhaps uninten-
tionally, gives the intruder an ability to monitor (but not to modify or re-schedule)
all incoming network traKc. This kind of corruption does not require that the corrupt
party has a malicious intent. All the intruder needs is an oversight in network protec-
tion. For example, careless disposal of incoming messages may enable the intruder to
root through the garbage and read all discarded messages. We will call this form of
corruption accidental corruption.
6. Analysis of the ASW protocol
In order to search for protocol errors, we implemented the exchange, abort, and re-
solve subprotocols in the Mur’ language. The protocol was combined with the standard
intruder model described in Section 2.1. The correctness conditions of Section 4 were
stated as Mur’ invariants. During state exploration, Mur’ checks that each invariant
holds in every reachable state. Conditions such as timeliness and non-repudiability can-
not be trivially represented as state invariants, and we have not veri.ed them formally.
Our .rst attempt to analyze the protocol failed because according to the protocol
speci.cation, the trusted third party T is always ready to accept abort and resolve
requests. Therefore, if one of the parties is strongly corrupt (i.e., the intruder has
access to its signing key – see Section 5.5), then in every state of the protocol the
intruder can generate a new resolve or, if O is the corrupt party, abort request and send
it to T . The trusted third party will then add the request to its database, resulting in a
new, larger state. This makes the state space of the protocol in.nite. The only solution
is to arbitrarily limit the number of times the intruder can generate a request to T in
the course of one instance of the protocol. This restriction is not necessary if there are
no corrupt parties, since there is only a .nite number of frivolous requests that can be
computed by the intruder. However, Mur’ analysis is slowed down considerably if in
every state there is an enabled rule allowing the intruder to send a request to T .
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This section describes the results of our analysis with the intruder limited to no more
than 2 requests to T per protocol instance. We only present analysis of fairness and
omit that of trusted third party accountability since we did not discover any interesting
behaviors in which accountability is violated.
6.1. Fairness
As a reminder, fairness guarantees that when the protocol has completed, either both
protocol participants have valid contracts, or neither one does (see Section 4).
Con6dential channels, one instance of the protocol. First, we analyzed one run,
or instance of the protocol under the assumption that all communication channels are
con.dential. This prevents the intruder from learning anything from the messages as
they pass through the network. The only operation the intruder can perform in this
setting is to store a message and replay it later. Mur’ did not discover any violations
of fairness. It did discover that the intruder can achieve the following:
• Prevent O from aborting the protocol by delaying its abort request to T until R
computes me2, and then submitting me1 and me2 (ostensibly from R) to T , thus
resolving the protocol. Then O will receive a replacement contract in response to
its abort request.
• Force O to submit an abort request to T by delaying me2.
• Force R (respectively, O) to submit a resolve request to T by delaying me3 (me4).
• Resolve the protocol directly by submitting a resolve request to T once both me1
and me2 have been sent into the network as part of the exchange subprotocol.
None of the above, however, is a violation of fairness as de.ned in Section 4.
Con6dential channels, two instances of the protocol. After increasing the bound on
the number of protocol instances, Mur’ discovered the following replay attack:
I observes an instance of the protocol
O → R me1 = S-SigO{VO; VR; T; text; hash(NO)}
R → O me2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(NR)}
O → R me3 = NO
R → O me4 = NR
Later : : :
I → R me1 = S-SigO{VO; VR; T; text; hash(NO)}
R → O me′2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(N ′R)}〈I intercepts〉
I → R me3 = NO
R → O me′4 = N ′R 〈I intercepts〉
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To stage this attack, the intruder must observe an instance of the protocol, recording
all messages sent by O. After the protocol completes, the intruder can initiate another
instance of the protocol by replaying the recorded me1. R will respond with a new
me′2, to which the intruder responds with the old me3. The result of this attack is that
the intruder can get R to commit to the text of an old contract with O without O’s or
T ’s knowledge.
The protocol as described in [2] contains no protection against this kind of attack.
Perhaps this was a conscious decision on the part of the protocol designers who did not
intend the protocol to be secure against replay attacks. If the contractual text contains
a timestamp, expiration date, or some other information that might help in determining
its freshness, R may be able to detect the attack. It can be argued that any well-written
contract must contain such information. However, this should be stated explicitly as
part of the protocol speci.cation and not left for the protocol user to infer.
The replay attack discovered by Mur’ is diJerent from the simpler one in which
a malicious R keeps the old contract to which O had previously committed and tries
to reuse it. In case of our replay attack, the new contract is di:erent from the old
one. Recall that a standard contract is the combination of me1, me2, and contract
authenticators: {me1; me2; NO; NR}. Since me2 is diJerent in the second instance of the
protocol, the contract is diJerent. This implies that O cannot even obtain a valid
replacement contract by requesting it from the trusted third party since in order to do
so, it needs me′2 which it never receives. In fact, O is not even aware that an exchange
between R and the intruder has taken place.
The replay attack succeeds even if both O and R are honest. Suppose that O is a
retailer who periodically purchases supplies from R online using the contract signing
protocol. All purchase contracts are exactly the same, as is often the case in real life,
and it is agreed (oUine) that all contracts expire immediately upon ful.llment (i.e., R
receives the order, .lls it, and forgets about it). Then the intruder can use the replay
attack to impersonate O and submit a false purchase contract on its behalf, convincing
R that O has committed to a new purchase and providing R with a false proof of O’s
commitment.
Note that there is no need for the intruder to involve the trusted third party in the
protocol in order to stage the replay attack. This means that there will be no evidence
of the attack such as could have been provided by a resolve request kept by T .
The main weakness of the protocol is the fact that O’s message me3 that contains
the contract authenticator is sent in response to R’s commitment message me2 but is
not related to it in any way, making it possible for the intruder to replay an old me3.
A small repair to the protocol that prevents the attack is described in Section 6.2.
Standard channels. After repairing the protocol to prevent the replay attack, we
performed Mur’ analysis without the con.dentiality assumption on the channels but
still within the constraints of the standard Dolev–Yao intruder model (see Section 2.1).
Mur’ did not discover any new attacks. This can be attributed to the fact that mes-
sages me1;2; ma1;2, and mr2 are all signed, and mr1 contains signed messages as its
components. Assuming that every protocol participant knows everybody else’s correct
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public key (this is a necessary requirement for the protocol to succeed even in the
absence of the intruder), signatures prevents the intruder from modifying messages in
transit. Since no signing keys are transmitted as part of the protocol, the intruder cannot
gain the ability to sign messages unless one of the parties leaks its key. Therefore, the
intruder is just as powerful as in the case of con.dential channels.
This result suggests that the channel con.dentiality assumption can be relaxed. The
protocol ensures fairness even if the channels are controlled by a Dolev–Yao intruder.
Malicious protocol participant. Finally, we analyzed the protocol under the assump-
tion that one of the participants is malicious. Mur’ discovered the following attack, in
which a malicious R obtains a contract which is inconsistent with that obtained by O.
O → R me1 = S-SigO{VO; VR; T; text; hash(NO)}
R → O me2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(NR)}
R computes new random N ′R and
me′2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(N ′R)};
but keeps them secret
O → R me3 = NO
R sends nothing
O → T mr1 = {me1; me2}
T → O mr2 = S-SigT{me1; me2}
In this attack, R computes two diJerent responses me2 and me′2 to O’s initial message
me1 using diJerent random numbers NR and N ′R . It sends out me2 and keeps the other
secret. After it receives O’s contract authenticator NO; R does not respond at all. It
has already obtained a valid standard contract {me1; NO; me′2; N ′R}. Since O does not
receive me4 from R, it requests trusted third party T to resolve the protocol. T issues
a replacement contract by counter-signing me1 and me2. However, O’s contract is
di:erent from that possessed by R because it contains the hash of a diJerent random
number: NR rather than N ′R .
This is a problem, since each party possesses a valid contract, but the two contracts
are inconsistent. Recall that the protocol employs a nonstandard de.nition of contracts
(Section 3.3), according to which a valid contract is more than a signed contractual
text. Even though the contractual texts in the two contracts are the same, the random
numbers and commitments are diJerent, and it is unclear how the contracts should be
enforced or interpreted, given that both are valid according to the protocol speci.cation.
The original paper [2] does not say anything about how this situation should be handled.
This problem is caused by the same weakness of the protocol that makes the replay
attack possible. O’s contract authenticator NO is sent in response to me2 but is not
explicitly linked to it. This enables R to use NO with a diJerent message me′2 to form
a valid contract without revealing its own commitment to O. More generally, Mur’
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analysis points to the fact that O’s half of the contract contains no information that links
it to R’s half of the contract. The modi.cation of the protocol described in Section 6.2
prevents this attack, too.
6.2. Repairing the protocol
The ASW protocol can be repaired so as to prevent the attacks described in Sec-
tion 6.1 by explicitly linking message me3 with message me2. This is a standard tech-
nique to ensure that an old me3 cannot be replayed by the intruder in response to
a fresh me2 and that R can obtain a standard contract only with the same contract
authenticator that it has sent to O as part of me2. A similar change must be made to
me4 to prevent a symmetric replay attack.
O → R me1 = S-SigO{VO; VR; T; text; hash(NO)}
R → O me2 = S-SigR{me1; hash(NR)}
O → R me3 = S-SigO{NO; hash(NR)}
R → O me4 = S-SigR{NR; hash(NO)}
The security of the repaired protocol against replay attacks is strengthened by the
fact that cryptographically secure signature schemes are necessarily indeterministic,
therefore, even if the same text is signed in two separate instances of the protocol, the
resulting messages will be diJerent.
7. Garay--Jakobsson--MacKenzie protocol
In this section, we describe the abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol of
Garay et al. [17]. The protocol is closely related to the ASW protocol described above.
Both involve a 4-step exchange subprotocol, and similar abort and resolve subproto-
cols. Even though the two protocols have similar structure, the actual contents of the
messages diJer. Unlike the ASW protocol, the GJM protocol is designed to guarantee
abuse-freeness in addition to fairness and third party accountability.
This section follows the pattern of Section 3. We start by brieQy describing the
objectives of the GJM protocol, explain the properties of private contract signatures
(PCS), an innovation of Garay et al. used to make contract signing abuse-free, and
describe the protocol steps in detail.
7.1. Objectives and assumptions
The GJM protocol is designed to enable two parties, O and R, to exchange signatures
on a contractual text. It is assumed that prior to executing the protocol, the parties agree
on each other’s identity, the contractual text, and the identity of the trusted third party
T . Every protocol participant is assumed to know the correct signature veri.cation
key of the other party and T . As above, we write S-Sigi(m) for the result of signing
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text m with the key of party i. It is also assumed that every participant has a private
communication channel with T .
The protocol is asynchronous. As the exchange protocol progresses, either participant
may contact the trusted third party T . The third party may decide, on the basis of the
communication it received, to either resolve the protocol by issuing the other party’s
signature, or “abort” the protocol by issuing an abort token. As in the ASW proto-
col, abort tokens are not a proof that the exchange has been canceled. The intruder
may schedule messages and insert its own messages in the network, but cannot delay
messages sent between participants and T inde.nitely.
7.2. Private contract signatures
The GJM protocol relies on the cryptographic primitive called private contract sig-
nature (PCS). We write PCSO(m; R; T ) for party O’s private contract signature of text
m for party R (known as the designated veri6er) with respect to third party T . The
main properties of PCS are summarized below:
• PCSO(m; R; T ) can be veri.ed like a conventional signature, i.e., there exists a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm PCS-Ver such that PCS-Ver(m;O; R; T; s) is true
i: s=PCSO(m; R; T ).
• PCSO(m; R; T ) can be feasibly computed by either O, or R, but nobody else. This
is the key property of PCS that distinguishes it from a conventional, universally
veri.able signature, as the latter can only be computed by O. When the designated
veri.er R receives s=PCSO(m; R; T ), he will be convinced that s was computed by
O, but, unlike O’s conventional signature, s cannot be used by R to prove this to
an outside party.
• PCSO(m; R; T ) can be converted into a conventional signature by either O, or T , but
nobody else, including R. For the purposes of this study, we focus on the third-party
accountable version of PCS, in which the converted signatures produced by O and
T can be distinguished. We will call them S-SigO(m) and T-SigO(m), respectively.
Unlike PCS, converted signatures are universally veri.able by anybody in possession
of the correct signature veri.cation key.
An eKcient discrete log-based PCS scheme is presented in [17].
7.3. Protocol
The GJM protocol consists of three interdependent subprotocols: exchange, abort,
and resolve. Message sequences are identical to those of the ASW protocol (see
Section 3.3). The parties (O and R) start the exchange by following the exchange
subprotocol. If both O and R are honest and there is no interference from the network,
they obtain each other’s signatures as the .nal steps of the exchange subprotocol. The
originator O also has the option of requesting the trusted third party T to abort an
exchange that O has initiated. To do so, O executes the abort subprotocol with T .
Finally, both O and R may each request that T resolve an exchange that has not been
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completed. After receiving the initial message of the exchange protocol, they may do
so by executing the resolve subprotocol with T .
At the end of the protocol, each party is guaranteed to end up with the other party’s
universally veri.able signature of the contractual text, or an abort token signed by T
and O, of the form S-SigT (S-SigO(m;O; R; abort)).
Exchange subprotocol. When there is no interference from the network and neither
party tries to cheat the other, O and R may exchange signatures by the following steps:
O → R me1 = PCSO(m; R; T )
R → O me2 = PCSR(m;O; T )
O → R me3 = S-SigO(m)
R → O me4 = S-SigR(m)
In the .rst step of this subprotocol, O commits to the contractual text m by producing
a private contract signature of m with R as the designated veri.er. The purpose of PCS
is to convince R that O signed m, while depriving R of the possibility to prove this
to an outside party. In the second step, R replies with its own PCS of m with O as
the designated veri.er. Finally, O and R exchange their actual, universally veri.able
signatures of m. At end of the exchange, both O and R obtain a signed contract of the
form {S-SigO(m);S-SigR(m)}.
Abort subprotocol. As in the ASW protocol, O may attempt to abort the exchange
if it times out waiting for a reply from R. Here are the steps of the subprotocol:
O → T ma1 = S-SigO(m;O; R; abort)
T → O ma2 = Has O or R resolved already?
Yes : S-SigR(m) if R has resolved; or
T-SigR(m) if O has resolved
No : S-SigT (ma1)
aborted := true
When T receives an abort request, T checks its permanent database of past actions to
decide how to proceed. If T has not previously been requested to resolve this instance
of the protocol, T marks m as aborted in its permanent database and sends an abort
token to O. If m is already marked as resolved, this means that T has previously
resolved this exchange in response to an earlier request. As a result of the resolution
procedure (described below), honest T must have obtained both O’s and R’s universally
veri.able signatures of m. Therefore, in response to O’s abort request, T forwards O
either S-SigR(m) or T-SigR(m), either of which can serve as a proof that R indeed
signed m.
An abort token is a promise by T that it will not resolve this instance of the
protocol in the future. It is not a proof that the exchange has been aborted, as the
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parties can complete contract signing without involving T if they follow the exchange
subprotocol.
Resolve subprotocol. Either party may request that T resolve the exchange. In order
to do so, the party must possess the other party’s PCS of the contract (with T as the
designated third party), and submit it to T along with its own universally veri.able
signature of the contract. Therefore, R can send a resolve request at any time after
receiving me1, and O can do so at any time after receiving me2. When T receives a
resolve request, it checks whether the contract is already marked as aborted. If it is,
T replies with the abort token. If the contract has been resolved by the other party,
T replies with that party’s signature. Finally, if the contract has been neither aborted,
nor resolved by the other party, T converts PCS into a universally veri.able signature,
sends it to the requestor, and stores the requestor’s own signature in its private database.
Below, we show the resolve protocol between R and T . The protocol between O
and T is symmetric.
R → T mr1 = PCSO(m; R; T );S-SigR(m)
T → R mr2 = Has O aborted already?
Yes : Send S-SigT (S-SigO(m;O; R; abort))
No : Has O resolved already?
Yes : Send S-SigO(m)
No : Store S-SigR(m)
Convert PCSO(m; R; T ) to T-SigO(m)
Send T-SigO(m)
resolved := true
As in the ASW protocol, the .rst request received by T determines the permanent
status of the protocol.
7.4. Correctness conditions
Correctness conditions for the GJM protocol are eJectively the same as those for
the ASW protocol, and can be found in Section 4 above. In addition to fairness, the
GJM protocol is designed to be abuse-free.
There are actually two versions of the GJM protocol, one providing third party
accountability and the other not. The diJerence between the two protocols lies in two
versions of PCS. In our analysis, we focus on the case when the PCS scheme provides
third-party accountability, i.e., the distributions of S-Sigi(m) and T-Sigi(m) are disjoint,
and thus it is possible for the veri.er to distinguish whether the signature is a “real”
signature of i, or a PCS of i converted by T . Since the steps of the protocol do not
allow T to both abort and resolve the protocol, any PCS conversion performed by T
after it aborted the protocol (and vice versa) can be traced to T and serve as a proof
of T ’s misbehavior.
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8. Analysis of the GJM protocol
We used Mur’ to perform .nite-state analysis of the GJM protocol. Since abuse-
freeness cannot be trivially represented as a state invariant, we employed a partial ver-
i.cation method described in Section 5.4. Corrupt protocol participants were modeled
as described in Section 5.5. In the rest of this section, we analyze protocol correctness
conditions, and suggest repairs to the protocol.
8.1. Fairness
First, we analyzed the protocol under the assumption that both participants are honest,
i.e., neither tries to cheat the other. This also implies that neither participant knowingly
cooperates with the intruder. Mur’ discovered the same execution sequences as for the
ASW protocol (see Section 6.1), none of which is a violation of fairness as de.ned in
Section 4.
There is an important diJerence between the GJM protocol and the ASW protocol.
In the latter, the intruder can directly resolve the protocol by submitting a resolve
request to T once both me1 and me2 have been sent into the network as part of the
exchange subprotocol. This is impossible in the GJM protocol since resolve requests
must include the originating party’s signature on the contract which the intruder cannot
compute without cooperating with that party.
In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on the cases when at least one of the
protocol participants is malicious or corrupt. For brevity, we omit the discussion of
all combinations and concentrate on the most interesting insights about the protocol
revealed by our analysis.
Weakly corrupt O, intruder monitors R→T channel. We analyzed the protocol
under the assumption that party O is malicious, i.e., its intention is to cheat R by
obtaining R’s signature of the contractual text m without releasing its own signature. O
is weakly corrupt: it is willing to engage the intruder’s help in obtaining R’s signature,
but will not sign or decrypt messages for the intruder.
The intruder I is assumed to have the ability to eavesdrop on and delay messages
sent from R to T , but not to modify or remove them. Below we analyze the protocol
under the assumption that the communication channel between R and T is inaccessible
to the intruder.
Under these assumptions, Mur’ uncovered the following attack:
O → R me1 = PCSO(m; R; T )
R → O me2 = PCSR(m;O; T )
I intercepts me2; or O receives and discards it
O → T ma1 = S-SigO(m;O; R; abort)
R → T mr1 = PCSO(m; R; T );S-SigR(m)
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I eavesdrops on mr1; learns S-SigR(m);
delays mr1 until T receives ma1
T → O ma2 = S-SigT (S-SigO(m;O; R; abort))
I intercepts ma2; or O receives and hides it
T → R mr2 = S-SigT (S-SigO(m;O; R; abort))
I → O S-SigR(m)
As a result, O obtains R’s signature of the contract S-SigR(m), while R obtains the
abort token from T .
Recall the second fairness condition from Section 4: once a correct participant (R)
obtains an abort token from the trusted third party T , it should be impossible for any
other participant to obtain a valid contract. This condition can be approximated by the
following safety invariant: “it is never the case that the correct participant possesses
the abort token, while some other participant possesses a valid contract, if the abort
token was received .rst”. Clearly, the above attack violates this invariant.
The .rst fairness condition is violated as well: the corrupt participant (O) obtained
a valid contract without allowing the remaining participant (R) to also obtain a valid
contract. The reason for this is that the only information from O that R has in its
possession is PCSO(m; R; T ) sent in message me1. This PCS can be converted into a
universally veri.able signature either by O (who will not do this because it is corrupt),
or by T (who won’t do this because it has already aborted the protocol, and must send
abort tokens in response to all requests). Therefore, R has no means to obtain O’s
universally veri.able signature of the contractual text m.
Since the fairness conditions from Section 4 do not hold, we believe this attack is a
bona .de violation of fairness. Even though it can be argued that R implicitly agreed to
sign the contract by sending its signature to T in message mr1, the fact that it received
an abort token in response should guarantee that a contract has not be signed. Note
the asymmetry between R and O here—since R may not initiate the abort subprotocol
itself, the abort token serves as a proof to R that the protocol has been canceled by
O, assuming T is honest. We also believe that this attack violates abuse-freeness (see
Section 8.3 below).
Weakly corrupt O, accidentally corrupt T . In order to stage the attack described in
the previous section, the intruder must be able to access the communication channel
between R and T . The original paper [17] speci.es that communication between any
participant and T is conducted over a private channel. In this case, the intruder will not
be able to eavesdrop on message mr1 sent by R to T in order to resolve the protocol,
and will not be able to learn S-SigR(m). In fact, even if R and T communicate over
a public network, encrypting mr1 with T ’s public key will prevent the intruder from
splitting it into parts and reusing one of the parts to help O gain an unfair advantage.
It is worth noting, however, that the protocol speci.cation in [17] does not require that
mr1 be encrypted.
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Now consider the case when the R → T channel is secure, but T is accidentally
corrupt, and I has passive access to all of its incoming communication (see Section 5.5
for our de.nition of accidental corruptness). This does not require active cooperation
with the intruder on the part of T , just negligence in handling messages it receives
from protocol participants. I does not need the ability to split messages into parts,
remove them from the network, or even insert its own messages into the network. I
only needs to make sure that T receives O’s abort request ma1 before it receives R’s
resolve request mr1. Scheduling the network to achieve this is not diKcult if malicious
O sends ma1 to T prior to sending me1 to R, while honest R receives me1, generates
me2 and then times out waiting for me3 before sending mr1 to T . Having passive access
to T ’s communication with R is suKcient for I to learn S-SigR(m) and divulge it to
O. Therefore, the attack succeeds in this case.
8.2. Trusted third party accountability
Suppose that T is accidentally corrupt and I successfully stages the attack described
in Section 8.1, causing R to lose fairness as a result. Since we are analyzing a TTP-
accountable version of the GJM protocol (see Section 7.4), we would like to verify
whether the trusted third party T can be held accountable, i.e., if R loses fairness
because of T ’s misbehavior, it must be able to prove the misbehavior to an arbiter or
veri.er in an external dispute.
For the purposes of our formal analysis, we followed the designers of the ASW pro-
tocol [2, 1] and assumed that the proof must consist of two inconsistent messages signed
by T , e.g., an abort token and a converted PCS. (Recall that in the TTP-accountable
version of PCS, T-SigR(m) obtained as a result of T ’s conversion of PCSR(m) is
distinct from S-SigR(m).) According to the protocol speci.cation, T must process all
requests on the .rst-come, .rst-served basis. Therefore, the .rst request received by T
determines the status of the contract in perpetuity, and it should never be the case that
T issues an abort token and a converted PCS signature for the same contract.
However, if R loses fairness as a result of T ’s accidental corruption, it has no
means of proving to an outside party that T is corrupt. O is in possession of genuine
S-SigR(m), not a converted PCS. If O is willing to lie about the source of this signature,
then R cannot pin the blame on T . The only message signed by T is the abort token,
and in the absence of two inconsistent messages signed by T , it is unclear what R can
use as a proof to hold T accountable.
Since abort requests are signed, R can prove that the abort token it received from
T was originally generated by O. But protocol speci.cation allows for the case when
O obtains a valid signature of R after sending oJ its abort request. This may happen
if, for example, T received R’s resolve request before O’s abort request, resolved the
protocol, and forwarded R’s signature in response to O’s abort request. O can also
claim that it received R’s signature directly from R.
At best, R can argue that either O, or T is lying: either O is lying that it received
R’s signature from T in response to its abort request, or T is lying that it received O’s
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abort request before R’s resolve request (in the latter case, T would not have sent the
abort token in response to R’s request). This is a very weak form of accountability—in
eJect, the cheated party in a 3-party protocol is arguing that one of the other two is
lying.
We believe that the diJerence between the possibilities (O is corrupt, or T is corrupt)
is too signi.cant to allow any confusion between the two. The protocol is designed to
withstand corrupt participants, so the fact that O is corrupt is fairly trivial. T , on the
other hand, plays a crucial role due to its ability to resolve or abort contract signings,
and any negligence or dishonesty on the part of T should be immediately detected and,
if proved, should lead to revocation of T’s authority to function as the trusted third
party.
8.3. Abuse-freeness
We claim that the attack described in Section 8.1 violates abuse-freeness of the
protocol by giving the originator O both the power to determine the outcome of the
protocol and the ability to prove this power to an outside arbiter A.
Suppose O uses A as a signature server—instead of signing messages to R with its
own private key, it asks A to do the signing with A’s private key to which O has
no access. This way A can keep track of all signed messages generated by O in the
protocol. If key certi.cates are used, then A can initiate the exchange subprotocol with
R under its own name, and O, using an intruder eavesdropping on the network and=or
an accidentally corrupt T , will demonstrate that it can drive the protocol to the desired
conclusion. In either case, A is able to maintain the list of all signatures generated by
the originator of the exchange.
O obtains both S-SigR(m) and S-SigT (S-SigO(m;O; R; abort)) by proceeding as in
Section 8.1. At this point, O is free to decide whether to enforce the contract using
the former, or consider it aborted using the latter. Thus it has the power to determine
the outcome of the protocol. It can prove this power by presenting both messages to
A. Note that in this case an abort token will convince A that O has the power to abort
the protocol since A keeps track of all signatures generated by O, and knows that
at no point in the protocol did O generate its signature on the contract, S-SigO(m).
This is diJerent from the case, considered in Section 3.3, where O initiates the abort
subprotocol with T after releasing its signature, and, therefore, O’s possession of the
abort token cannot serve as a proof that O is capable of aborting the protocol.
The argument about TTP accountability given in Section 8.2 applies to abuse-freeness
as well as to fairness. If R is abused by O as a consequence of T ’s accidental corruption,
R cannot prove to an outside arbiter that T misbehaved.
8.4. Repairing the protocol
The basic error in the GJM protocol can be attributed to the fact that data sent in
the resolve subprotocol are exactly the same as data sent in the exchange subprotocol.
The GJM protocol can therefore be repaired by replacing the standard signature in
V. Shmatikov, J.C. Mitchell / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 419–450 447
each resolve request with PCS. This was independently suggested by the authors of
the protocol after we brought the attack described in Section 8.1 to their attention [22].
In the repaired protocol, resolve requests from R to T will have the following form
(requests from O to T are symmetric):
mr1 = PCSO(m; R; T ); PCSR(m; O; T ):
Our analysis of the repaired protocol did not uncover any attacks. Mur’ con.rmed that
R still has the power to determine the outcome of the protocol after receiving the .rst
message from O (see Section 5.4). However, the only information in R’s possession at
this point is PCSO(m; R; T ), and R cannot use it to prove anything to an outside arbiter
due to the designated veri.er property of PCS (see Section 7.2). We conclude that the
repaired protocol is abuse-free. By contrast, the ASW protocol is not abuse-free. In the
ASW protocol, R, too, has the power to determine the outcome after the .rst message
received from O, but since universally veri.able signatures are used, this power can
be proved to an outside arbiter.
Unlike the original protocol, the repaired protocol is TTP-accountable. In the repaired
protocol, T never receives universally veri.able signatures of the contract from either
O, or R. Any universally veri.able signature leaked by corrupt T must be the result
of PCS conversion, and its origin can be traced to T if the TTP-accountable version
of PCS is used.
Mur’ analysis indicates that the private channel assumption for communication be-
tween protocol participants and T can be relaxed. Even if the intruder can eavesdrop
on messages exchanged with T , the protocol is still fair and abuse-free as long as the
channels are resilient, i.e., every message is guaranteed to eventually reach its intended
recipient. This is signi.cant because this implies that the repaired protocol does not
need to operate on top of a secrecy protocol, or use any form of encryption in order
to guarantee fairness. The protocol can still be subject to cryptographic attacks on PCS
and signature schemes and=or other attacks that could not have been discovered in the
Mur’ model.
Additional analysis of the repaired protocol has been performed by Satyaki Das
using the new-generation Mur’ tool that relies on predicate abstractions to analyze
in.nite state spaces. It did not discover any attacks on an arbitrary number of protocol
instances executed by diJerent principals.
9. Conclusions
This study shows how a .nite-state analysis tool can be used to study contract signing
protocols and discover potential attacks and weaknesses. The main insights into the
protocols are a weakness in the Asokan–Shoup–Waidner protocol and an error in the
Garay–Jakobsson–MacKenzie protocol. In both cases, we give simple changes to one or
two messages that eliminate these problems. Whatever usefulness the protocols might
have in their original form, we believe that these small changes are clear improvements
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in the protocol that will be useful to anyone who wishes to use these or related
protocols in practice. In addition, our Mur’-based analysis clari.es the private-channel
assumptions needed to guarantee protocol correctness.
Several modeling challenges arose in this study, since the properties involved in
contract signing protocols are diJerent and more subtle or more complex than the
correctness conditions for common secrecy and authentication protocols studied ex-
tensively in the literature. The correctness properties for these protocols are fair-
ness, third-party accountability, and abuse-freeness. While fairness and accountabil-
ity can be determined from the traces of terminating protocol runs, abuse-freeness
is not a trace-based property. The reason is that abuse relies on intermediate states
where one party has the power to unilaterally determine whether or not a contract
is produced. This is precisely the kind of property that has motivated researchers in
concurrency theory to develop partial order models of concurrent systems [19, 26].
Since Mur’ is a trace-based tool, we can only formalize and check an approxi-
mation to abuse-freeness. More speci.cally, we conjectured the states of protocol
execution that allow one party power over the other and then veri.ed our conjec-
ture by Mur’ analysis of a modi.ed protocol environment. In this modi.ed environ-
ment, an outside observer called the Challenger nondeterministically challenges one
party to demonstrate power over the outcome of the protocol. If that party suc-
ceeds in meeting every challenge, then that party must have the power to deter-
mine the outcome. Moreover, veri.cation that every challenge is met is a trace-based
property. We believe that this method for verifying non-trace-based properties us-
ing trace-based tools may be useful for verifying control-related properties of other
protocols.
Fair exchange protocols are a new area of application for formal methods, and
speci.cation of protocol guarantees in the form suitable for automated veri.cation is
still a challenge, especially in the case of such non-trivial properties as trusted third
party accountability and abuse-freeness. We do believe that as online fair exchange and
contract signing protocols gain increasing acceptance and a correspondingly high level
of assurance is expected from them, formal techniques such as .nite-state analysis will
prove useful for uncovering interesting insights and non-obvious attacks.
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